Overview

The Supreme Court of NSW has clarified a key point under the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017: pet care services can fall within compensable statutory benefits. In Insurance Australia Ltd t/as NRMA Insurance v Chowdhury [2025] NSWSC 1392, the Court confirmed that feeding, watering and litter-changing for domestic pets may constitute ‘domestic services’ under the definition of attendant care. This decision signals a broader interpretation of treatment and care expenses, impacting claims handling and cost management.

Key Takeaways

This Supreme Court decision confirms the costs of what were described as ‘pet care services’ can fall within the regime for the payment of statutory benefits under s3.24 of the Motor Accidents Injuries Act 2017 (MAI Act). Specifically, it was held that services relating to the care of the claimant’s domestic pets were not excluded from the definition of ‘attendant care services’, under s1.4 of the MAI Act.

Facts

The claimant (who was the respondent to the Summons), Mr Chowdhury, was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 11 November 2024. He sustained a fractured right ankle and left wrist injury, requiring hospitalisation for some five weeks. After he was discharged from hospital, he was unable to perform certain weight-bearing tasks for a period.

As part of the claimant’s claim for statutory benefits, he claimed services comprising of feeding, watering, and changing the litter of his three cats (hereafter referred to as ‘pet care services’). The insurer (who was the applicant to the Summons) refused to pay for the claimed pet care services; a decision that was upheld on internal review.

This gave rise to a dispute between the claimant and the insurer, which was referred to the Personal Injury Commission (PIC) initially as a medical assessment matter. It ultimately proceeded as a miscellaneous claims assessment matter to consider whether pet care services were ‘treatment and care expenses’ under s1.4 of the MAI Act.

Section 1.4 of the MAI Act provides an exhaustive definition of treatment and care expenses (qualified only by paragraph (l), which permits the Regulations to expand the definition – something Parliament has not yet deemed necessary). Broadly, the services contemplated by the definition are those directed to:

• Medical and therapeutic needs – medical treatment (including pharmaceuticals), dental treatment, rehabilitation, ambulance transportation
• Personal support and assistance – respite care, attendant care services
• Functional aids and adaptations – aids and appliances, prostheses, home and transport modifications, workplace and educational facility modifications
• Restoration of independence and participation – education and vocational training.

Being an exhaustive definition, the services claimed by the claimant needed to fall within one the categories listed in the definition.

The parties agreed that the only category in which pet care services (of the kind claimed) could fall was ‘attendant care services’, which is itself defined by s1.4 of the MAI Act, as: ‘…services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services.’ It was further agreed by the parties that the only provision that might cover pet care services was ‘domestic services.’

While the insurer accepted that feeding, watering and changing litter appeared to be ‘everyday tasks’, it was less willing to agree that these tasks were ‘domestic services’, arguing that the legal meaning of ‘attendant care services’ excluded the services of caring for a domestic pet.

At first instance, PIC Member Cassidy relied upon the obiter observations of Basten JA in Teuma & Anor v C P & P K Judd Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 166 at [98], which indicated that: ‘caring for pets, like caring for furniture, is an inherent part of the concept of domestic assistance.’ In view of that commentary, and Mr Chowdhury’s circumstances, the Member determined that the claimed pet care services were compensable by way of statutory benefits under the MAI Act.

The insurer sought judicial review of that decision in the Supreme Court, before McHugh JA.

Issues

The central issue before the court was whether, despite the ordinary meaning of the words, the definition of ‘attendant care services’ excluded the services of caring for a domestic pet.

A substantial part of the insurer’s argument relied upon the two preceding statutory motor accident regimes and cases decided in the context of those regimes, particularly to support a narrow construction of s3.24(1) of the MAI Act. The insurer contended that:

1. Damages are not recoverable at common law for gratuitous pet care services
2. Language in predecessor statutes regulating such claims was designed to cover only Griffiths v Kerkemeyer care, and not pet care
3. The 2017 Act was enacted against that background and uses similar language
4. The objects and secondary materials for the 2017 Act do not indicate any intention to expand compensation beyond what was available at common law and emphasise cost containment, and
5. Parliament should therefore be taken to have intended that pet care services fall outside the definition of ‘attendant care services’ in the 2017 Act.

For the reader’s ease of reference, Griffiths v Kerkemeyer damages refer to compensation awarded at common law for the value of care and assistance provided to an injured person by family or friends, even if that care was given gratuitously. At common law, gratuitous pet care services are not recoverable in personal injury claims: see, eg, Geaghan v D'Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260; Teuma & Anor v C P & P K Judd Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 166.

Decision

While the Court accepted that, on the authority of Geaghan, damages were not recoverable at common law for the value of gratuitous pet care services, it rejected the notion that the unavailability of a claim for gratuitous pet care at common law barred claims for pet care under the statutory benefits regime in the 2017 Act. It confirmed that the scheme for payment of statutory benefits for treatment and care under the 2017 Act is a scheme for reimbursement of expenses incurred.

Given the widespread practice of keeping pets, the Supreme Court said:

‘…it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the services of feeding and watering domestic cats and changing their litter are, as a matter of ordinary English meaning, domestic services. They serve the ordinary household purpose of attending to the basic needs of a domestic pet.’

The Court emphasised that while the objectives of the Act may sometimes pull in different directions, balancing support for injured persons with the need to keep insurance premiums affordable, statutory interpretation should focus on the actual language and operation of the Act. The Court also made it clear that the 2017 Act was intended to ‘start with a clean slate’ and should not be read as limited by the scope of previous legislation or common law principles. The operative provisions of the Act should be given their ordinary and natural meaning.

Legal Commentary

There are other distinct issues that arise in the context of pets and treatment or care that have been determined in the Commission, including:

• In Meneses v Lifetime Care and Support Authority of New South Wales [2024] NSWPIC 428, Member Cassidy accepted that a service or assistance animal (such as a mindDog-accredited dog) could fall within the definition of rehabilitation and therefore be a form of treatment, particularly where the animal was recommended by medical professionals to assist with psychological injury
• Similarly, in Irani v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2024] NSWPIC 455, it was determined that emotional support or therapy animals could also be considered a form of rehabilitation and thus treatment, even where the animals were not formally trained as assistance animals
• In Irani v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWPICMP 832, the review panel found that the costs of dog walking and washing did not constitute treatment or care because they were not ‘domestic services.’ This question may well have been decided differently if it had been determined after Chowdhury, but in any event the Review Panel found that the claimant’s need for the services (dog washing and walking) did not arise from the psychological injury he sustained in the accident.

Conclusion

The approach by the Supreme Court signals that future disputes should be resolved by close attention to the text and purpose of the current Act, rather than by reference to earlier regimes or restrictive common law analogies.

It should also be borne in mind that there is a distinction between pet care forming part of domestic services – which may be permitted in light of Chowdhury – and costs associated with pets (and possibly pet care) who form part of a claimant’s treatment.

Further information / assistance regarding the issues raised in this article is available from the authors Erin Woodward, Partner and Michelle Gattin, Lawyer, or your usual contact at Moray & Agnew.