AAI Limited v Hernandez [2026] ACTSC 429
To remit to to not remit? That was the the question before the ACT Supreme Court in Moray & Agnew’s successful appeal for GIO in AAI Ltd v Hernandez [2026] ACTSC 429.
The appeal arose from the decision in the ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) dealing with Quality of Life (QOL) benefits applications under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2019 (ACT) (MAI Act): Hernandez v AAI Limited t/as GIO [2025] ACAT 45.
An appeal is not available as of right from a first instance ACAT decision. Moray & Agnew instead applied to the ACAT for a referral to the Supreme Court on separate question of law:
On a proper statutory construction of Part 2.6 and Part 2.10 of the MAI Act, did the Tribunal err in directing that the applicant make a revised final WPI offer in accordance with the WPI as assessed by the private medical examiner (Dr Ridhalgh)?
Factual Background
The claimant was injured in a motor accident and lodged a QOL benefits application with GIO. The claimant was referred for an assessment of the WPI for his physical injuries sustained in the accident.
The authorised IME provider, MLCOA, arranged for an independent medical examiner (IME) to produce what purported to be a first WPI report. That report did not provide an impairment rating for the claimant’s injuries. GIO pressed the IME to provide an impairment rating in two supplementary reports but no rating was forthcoming. Instead, the IME found there was ‘no rateable impairment’.
The claimant obtained a second WPI report in response that assessed WPI at greater than 10%. When presented with the second WPI report, the IME maintained her position that there was no rateable impairment. A final WPI offer was issued on the basis that WPI was 0%.
At first instance, the ACAT held that an insurer is required to give reasons for a WPI offer. The ACAT also held that there was no compliant first WPI report as the IME’s reports had not provided any rateable impairment. Those findings were not contested on appeal.
Instead, the appeal concerned ACAT’s direction that GIO make a revised final WPI offer in accordance with the WPI as assessed in the second WPI report.
GIO contested that direction. We argued for GIO that the ACAT should not have ‘set’ the WPI and instead ought to have remitted the matter to the insurer for further determination according to law.
Findings
Muller J agreed that the ACAT erred in making a direction that ‘set’ the WPI for a final WPI offer.
The ACAT had legitimately identified legal error in the insurer’s final WPI offer and shortcomings in the
fact-finding process that led to that offer.
However, the ACAT fell into error when it took a further step on identification of those errors and directed the insurer as to the quantum of a final WPI offer.
That was an error because of the nature of an insurer’s decision-making power under the MAI Act. During a QOL application, an insurer has discretion in its decision-making power at various points. This includes:
- When an application is first lodged – here, an insurer can decided that there is no impairment and refuse to refer a claimant for a WPI assessment;
- When issuing a QOL benefits offer following a first WPI report – here, an insurer has discretion when WPI is assessed at less than 5% to make an offer to the claimant, although it is not compelled by the MAI Act to do so; and
- When issuing a final WPI offer – here, an insurer is left to decide WPI based on the opinions of the assessors who provided the first and second WPI reports.
The nature of that discretion was highlighted by Muller J in another recent decision of Millmore v McInerney [2026] ACTSC 397, which Moray & Agnew reported upon here.
Muller J held the fact that the ACAT would have exercised the discretion available to the insurer in a different way was not a proper basis to interfere with or control the exercise of the insurer’s discretion. The direction to ‘set’ WPI fettered the insurer’s disretion and was in error.
Instead, Muller J indicated that a suitable direction would have been one requiring the insurer to arrange a WPI assessment and, in turn, a WPI report.
In other words, when asked whether to remit or to not remit; the answer was to remit.
Conclusion
The decision provides more helpful authoritative jurisprudence on QOL applications and the ACAT’s powers under s197 when determining QOL applications.
The appeal also reinforces the point made in Neish v NRMA [2022] ACAT 24 that the task of the ACAT is to consider whether:
- The relevant requirements of the MAI Act and the Guidelines have been substantially complied with;
- A proper fact-finding process has been engaged; and
- Procedural fairness was observed in reaching the decision.
However, precisely how an insurer’s discretion is to be exercised when making decisions in QOL applications remains unanswered. Expect future decisions under the MAI Act to provide guidance on that issue.
This article was co-authored with contributions from Izaac Molenkamp, Associate.